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THE CULTURE AND CONFLICT REVIEW 
Improving Afghan Governance: Why the Task May be Self-Defeating
Capt Daniel Schierling, USMC, 10/1/2011 
But foreign intervention, if it is a brief affair, cannot shift the domestic balance of power in
any decisive way toward the forces of freedom, while if it is prolonged or intermittently
resumed, it will itself pose the greatest possible threat to the success of those forces.[1]
The struggle to define an appropriate mission for the military’s presence in Afghanistan is perhaps best
illustrated in Bob Woodward’s latest book, Obama’s Wars. The narrative contained within the book
demonstrates that at the highest political and military levels, there exists strong disagreement
concerning America’s interests in Afghanistan and the best course of action to secure those interests.
Interestingly, the debate has hinged almost exclusively on the number of troops to be committed to the
conflict, within the framework of the proposed counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN)
missions. While acknowledging the significant challenges presented by a double-dealing Pakistan and
corrupt Karzai government, there were no serious plans to address these concerns. These omissions
underscore the inflated role that the military has taken in a war plagued with innumerable political
spoilers.
In his book, Woodward relates a meeting that took place among President Obama, Secretary of State
Clinton, and Secretary of Defense Gates on Oct 7, 2009. During the meeting, the three agree that
“Fixing the Afghan government was central to the mission if the U.S. was ever going to get out.”[2]
Similarly, on July 4, 2009, General McChrystal (then ISAF Commander) was told that “We could run the
finest counterinsurgency campaign in world history and still fail because of the weak and corrupt Afghan
government.”[3] In a kind of compromise, the Obama administration has reduced the scope of its
mission in Afghanistan, focusing only on improving governance and establishing key institutions like the
Afghan National Army and Police.[4] Nevertheless, there persists a fundamental assumption that the
commitment of more troops and financial assistance will strengthen the existing Afghan government and
facilitate the withdrawal of US troops.
This article aims to challenge this assumption. It is not within the scope of this article to examine
whether the new troop levels will be sufficient to support either a CT or COIN methodology; or whether
or not either strategy is appropriate or might be successful. This essay seeks to demonstrate that the
international aid provided (both troops and money) has and will continue to undermine the authority,
sovereignty, and legitimacy of the Afghan government at all levels. Therefore, there exists a
fundamental paradox in the idea of providing more troops and money in order to improve Afghan
governance. Evidence of this paradox can be seen recently in the increased tensions between U.S.
policy-makers and Afghan President Hamid Karzai. There is a broad theoretical basis for this argument
that dates back as far as John Stuart Mill, who considered self-determination to be of primary
importance in the development and preservation of liberty. For a number of reasons (which will be
addressed below), this theory has fallen into disrepute in modern politics. However, this author argues
that there are important lessons that can be gleaned from this theory that contradict many of the
assumptions held by the top political and military officers responsible for leading the war in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, this lack of theoretical discussion has lead top political leaders to pursue policies that are
ultimately self-defeating.
Theory and Literature
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John Stuart Mill, a leading political theorist from the 19th Century, believed in a categorical distinction
between civilized countries and barbaric peoples. Among the former, nations practice the international
norm of non-intervention because they recognize their mutual right to independence and nationality.
Meanwhile, the latter represent peoples “to whom nationality and independence are either a certain evil,
or at best a questionable good.”[5] Mill recognized that such people have only “the right to be properly
educated and the right to become a nation.”[6] In short, Mill rejected the idea that self-determination and
political freedom were inherent rights of all people. Hence, Mill would have found the contemporary
norm advocating intervention for the facilitation of self-determination unthinkable. Mill’s argument is more
recently picked up by Michael Walzer, who adds theoretical clarity to Mill’s position by claiming that
foreign intervention to establish self-determination and liberty “necessarily fails.” [Italics original][7] He
further expands on Mill’s idea by writing that “a state is self-determining even it its citizens struggle and
fail to establish free institutions, but it has been deprived of self-determination if such institutions are
established by an intrusive neighbor.”[8] Thus, Walzer makes an important distinction between political
freedom and self-determination. Walzer himself seems to struggle with the exact definitions of the two.
Political freedom refers to the free institutions which may or may not take the form of representative
government. Meanwhile, “self-determination is the school in which virtue is learned (or not) and liberty is
won (or not).”[9] As best as can be inferred, self-determination exists in a state that is independent and
free from outside influence or the threat of intervention. Of the two, self-determination is more valuable
both because it connotes sovereignty, and because it can set the stage for the later development of
political freedoms. Both Mill and Walzer agree that true political freedom is impossible without the prior
attainment of self-determination.
This theoretical framework (which Michael Doyle labels “National Liberal”) contrasts vividly with the
cosmopolitan liberal framework that has risen to prominence in the American conscience. The
cosmopolitan liberal framework argues for a “flat, confident moral universe” in which all peoples deserve
a minimum degree of human rights.[10] Some enumerate these as merely basic freedoms from
“arbitrary killing, from torture, and from assault”, while others add things like free speech, democratic
elections, and private property.[11] It is likely some form of this cosmopolitan liberal thinking that has led
President Obama to say that “For the Afghan people, the return to Taliban rule would condemn their
country to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralyzed economy and the denial of basic
human rights to the Afghan people, especially women and girls.”[12] While no one is arguing the
substance of this statement, it raises two important questions: First, does the international community
have the responsibility to prevent these abuses? Clearly President Obama and the rest of his advisors
have sided with the cosmopolitan liberals in asserting that the United States should seek to prevent
such abuses. Second, does the international community even have the resources to establish political
freedom?
Fundamentally, this is the question that has stumped the highest officials within the US government. Our
focus, however, requires us to view this question from a different perspective: Given the above
distinction between political freedom and self-determination, can the international community leverage
its resources in a way that establishes political freedom without undermining the self-determination of
Afghanistan? In other words, can the US and its allies establish a free and effective Afghan government
that is both legitimate in the eyes of its citizens and sovereign in the minds of its neighbors? This article
comes to the same conclusion as does Michael Walzer: that any attempt to do so necessarily fails.
In order to make this claim, however, we must understand something about how a government
establishes sovereignty and legitimacy. For insight into this process, we can turn to Charles Tilly, whose
state-making theory speaks directly to this study. Tilly has noted that modern states emerged during
times of war – and only after they demonstrated the capacity to raise taxes, field a military, exploit and
consolidate their natural resources, and develop a national identity. Tilly’s theory of state-making has
spawned a veritable wave of literature analyzing the effects of war on the building of states, especially in
the contemporary third world. Michael Desch argues that both internal and external threats contribute to
the formation of a state. However, a state that plays a primarily economic role differs significantly from
one whose primary role is in the military.[13] Cameron Thies has applied Tilly’s Bellicist argument for
developing states in Latin America.[14] His data suggest that fighting an external rival tends to increase
a state’s capacity for extracting taxes, while a fight among internal rivals decreases it through a number
of means.[15] However, he also notes that the modern trend of accruing national debt tends to mitigate
this difference.[16] It is also important to note that his work is concerned primarily with post-colonial
state-building. Cohen, Brown and Organski argue that the consolidation of power that ultimately forms
an effective state is a violent and competitive process. They argue that instead of being interpreted as
signs of political decay, violent power struggles – even when couched in terms of ethnic, religious, or
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tribal conflicts – are signs of political consolidation.[17] Herbst has explored Tilly’s theory in the
development of African states, which share many characteristics (such as low population density and
inhospitable terrain) with Afghanistan.[18] Other important scholars are Robert Bates[19], Jaggers,[20]
Kirby and Ward[21], Lustick[22], and Stubbs[23].
Most important to the thesis of this article is the work of Taylor and Botea.[24] In a comparative study of
Vietnam and Afghanistan, they determine two preconditions that they believe facilitate the creation of a
state during times of war: ethnic homogeneity and revolutionary ideology.[25] Taylor and Botea must
certainly be applauded for their selection of “most-likely” case studies and methodology. Vietnam and
Afghanistan are both excellent examples of nations torn by decades of war, and are also extremely
divergent in their contemporary forms as modern states. Nevertheless, Taylor and Botea have only
examined the effects of ethnography and ideology, and their results indicate only mixed success in
applying Tilly’s theory to the contemporary third world. They conclude, rather unpersuasively, that war-
making only contributes to state-making in nations that have already developed a cohesive state.
What Taylor and Botea have ignored is the influence of external nations. While neighboring states play
an important role in Tilly’s state-making thesis – through military conquest or threat of invasion – it is a
very recent development that they have become involved in the process of self-determination. If this
development is as important as this article portrays, it may explain why Tilly’s theory has received such
ambivalent results in the modern development of states. Taylor and Botea recognize this modern
development, but fail to give it proper accord. They cite Robert Jackson’s distinction between positive
(effective) and negative (juridical) sovereignty.[26] Jackson’s theory proposes that the international
community has accorded an unwarranted level of sovereignty to many nations.[27] For example, since
the Second World War, offensive war has been categorized as illegal (as well as colonization), and
modern political borders are enforced by the international community. Likewise, the very notion of
sovereignty has devolved to mean less the ability to control one’s territory and population, and more to
be recognized as legitimate by the international community. Jackson’s theory helps to explain why Mill’s
distinction between civilized and barbarous nations has lost favor in the modern world. In watering down
our notion of sovereignty, we may have undermined the very process by which it is developed.
The Exaggerated Systemic Challenges to State-Building in Afghanistan
Scholars frequently point to systemic challenges to explain modern deficiencies of governance. There is
little doubt that Afghanistan presents systemic challenges to any attempt to form a cohesive state
government. Yet, these challenges are often exaggerated. What is more, scholars fail to note that many
successful states faced many of these same challenges early in their own state-building processes.
Often referred to as the “graveyard of empires”, Afghanistan encompasses rugged terrain that has
challenged historical attempts to subdue it.[28] Its central position in Asia made it a valuable conquest,
and it persisted in being an important part of empires even until  the 19th century. Nevertheless, the lack
of any easily traversed road or river system means that vast portions of the country remain isolated from
each other.[29] No doubt that this has played an instrumental role in the development of the modern
Afghan state. It is impossible, however, to attribute the present political fragmentation to mere
geography, since there are other states that have overcome similar challenges.
Thomas Barfield introduces a related concept that has much more profound consequences. He notes
that the modern boundaries of Afghanistan are arbitrary in that they do not fall along ethnic or even
historic political divisions.[30] The perfect example of this arbitrariness is the Durand Line, the border
imposed in 1893 by the British between British India and Afghanistan. Barfield notes that Afghans reject
the Durand Line as their border because it split the Pashtun population.[31] Sana Haroon further
illustrates the problems with the border by citing disagreements between the British and the Afghans
regarding major features on the map used to depict the line.[32] Yet, while the border remains fixed, it
also remains unenforceable. There is evidence that both the Taliban and the Pakistani military (both with
their roots in the divided Pashtun tribes) have no reason to seal the border, and actually benefit from
having it easily transited. This, in fact, poses the greater threat to state-building. That the international
community is unwilling to renegotiate the border, and that each state is unwilling to enforce it presents a
stalemate that defies a major tenet in the theories of both Charles Tilly and Max Weber: the effective
control over territory.
Dennis Young has attributed Afghanistan’s failure to produce an effective government in part to its
historic lack of a democratic tradition.[33] This too seems to exaggerate a nearly universal systemic
challenge. Democratic traditions were certainly not present in Europe even after the formation of the
modern state. In fact, to require democracy before a state can be formed defies both logic and theory.
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More precisely, Thomas Barfield explains that the historic rulers of Afghanistan were limited to the
smaller tribes, and that what is unique about Afghanistan is that the remaining sub-tribes were content
to allow this power in exchange for local autonomy.[34] Thus, it is more accurate to say that Afghanistan
has a tradition in which local groups favor local liberty rather than national power. Furthermore,
“cooperation or hostility between particular groups is determined by the scope of the problem at hand,”
meaning that centrifugal forces within society pull factions into isolation when not threatened by external
actors.[35] Tilly’s theory would suggest that this trend probably has more to do with the transitory nature
of the threat rather than the strength of its centrifugal force.
Finally, Taylor and Botea claim that ethnic fractionalization systemically weakens national government.
Their data demonstrate “a clear relationship between ethnic homogeneity and state strength” for the
selected countries.[36] But this claim is far from uncontested. Citing studies conducted by Daniel
Posner, Carol Riphenburg writes that “Countries containing a single large ethnic group or two evenly
matched groups . . . have been found to be more violence-prone than those including a larger number
of equally sized groups.”[37] Similarly, she cites James Fearon and David Laitin in concluding that “a
greater degree of ethnic or religious diversity . . . does not by itself make a country more prone to civil
war.”[38] Obviously, there is a significant chasm between the lack of civil war on one hand and the
formation of a successful state on the other. Thomas Johnson has written that “Afghanistan’s diverse
ethnic composition makes democracy or even state building difficult.”[39] Elsewhere, Johnson more
specifically notes that “successful democracies build into their system procedures and mechanisms that
allow minority groups to . . . feel included in the overall governing process.”[40] Broad ethnic
representation may be important for democracies, but are not necessarily required for the formation of a
state. Ethnic representation could be considered an important reform to democratize and consolidate an
existing government. But to require it at the outset may be putting the proverbial cart before the horse.
That Afghan politicians and foreign powers have encouraged ethnic division may contribute more to
ethnic in-fighting and fragmentation rather than democratic consolidation.[41] The future of ethnic
cooperation or conflict in Afghanistan will be largely self-fulfilling: to the extent that tribal affiliations
remain the primary tool for personal identity, they will continue to be the most divisive at the national
level.[42] Therefore, the paramount task is to raise national identity above tribal loyalty.[43]
The systemic challenges often cited for the failure of state-building in Afghanistan are insufficient to
account for the failure of the contemporary Afghan state. Perhaps the best argument for this claim is to
point to the 19th Century incarnations of the Afghan state. While admittedly weak and ultimately
unsuccessful, they very nearly approached the definition of a sovereign state. Dost Muhammad’s second
reign (1843-1863) brought most of the Afghan territory under his control and even established an
effective tax system that nearly tripled his annual revenue.[44] In like fashion, his successor – Sher Ali,
built a professional army and reorganized society to support it. While still reliant on both British and
Indian aid, Sher Ali was able to field a 56,000 man army and further expand his tax revenue to support
it.[45]
The Destruction of a Tribal Society: 1978-2001
What remains for this article is to conduct a brief analysis of the last 32 years of war in Afghanistan. This
account seeks to demonstrate that Charles Tilly’s theory has indeed been at work in many important
ways, and that decades of war have resulted in societal changes that have set conditions necessary for
the building of a future Afghan state. On many levels, these changes could be seen to have created a
demand for an effective national government. At the same time, however, the influence of particular
external nations and the international community as a whole has systematically undermined many of
these developments.
To simply state that Afghanistan is a tribal society is to disregard many important societal changes of
the past three decades. In fact, the tribal dynamic has been decreasing in both power and influence in
Afghanistan. Antonio Guistozzi quotes an Afghan NGO official as saying that the tribal system itself “is in
crisis and that it can no longer ‘provide peace, income, a sense of purpose, a social network’ to the local
youth.”[46] Giustozzi believes that the Taliban rose to power because they were able to exploit the
growing weaknesses of the tribal system and offer order, justice, and stability.[47] To find the origins of
this trend, however, we must look back further than the Taliban. In fact, the breakdown of the tribal
system dates back at least to the Soviet invasion in 1979. The Soviet-sponsored PDPA government had
initiated a series of reforms that sought to quickly revolutionize and modernize Afghanistan. These
initiatives included education, radical land reform, religion, and gender equality.[48] Of these programs,
it was perhaps the anti-Islam reforms that sparked the most severe rebellions, leading to the Soviet
invasion to help the PDPA hold onto power. The tribal system began its irreversible change when the US
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began to arm local resistance groups, to include mullahs and their loyalists, in order to repel the Soviet
troops. This created asymmetry between the traditionally balanced khan (the tribal political leader) and
the mullah (the apolitical religious leader).[49] This asymmetry had several effects. First, it gave the
mullahs unprecedented power and enabled political aspirations. Second, it promoted warlordism and the
development of a “Kalashnikov culture”.[50] Lastly, the funding and arming of these new religious tribes
encouraged association with foreign and international Islamists – leading to a religious radicalization that
had been absent in the traditional tribal system. As mentioned above, there is evidence that this kind of
militant violence can be interpreted as a sign of political consolidation – or at least resulting in a societal
demand for such consolidation.[51] Similarly, Thomas Barfield notes that the government institutions
that had existed before 1979 withered and vanished. While this left much more autonomy to the local
leaders, the dynamics of local communities had changed from tribal and landowning leadership to “a
new class of younger military commanders.”[52] Thus, the failing Afghan state bequeathed many of its
functions such as law-making and law-enforcing to local leadership that was no longer dominated by the
traditional tribal structures.
Antonio Guistozzi writes that “the youth who grew up in the Pakistani refugee camps were much less
likely to be respectful of the tribal elders.”[53] This underscores both the fundamental breakdown of the
tribal authority structure and also the general effects of the refugee camps. It is probably impossible to
overestimate the importance of Afghan refugees in modern Afghanistan. Within months after the Soviet
invasion refugees fled to Pakistan in huge numbers. Sana Haroon writes of 278 Refugee Tented
Villages in the NWFP.[54] Thomas Barfield estimates that “Three to five million people fled Afghanistan
to become refugees in Iran and Pakistan, while an almost equal number sought safety in Afghanistan’s
cities and towns.”[55] While undoubtedly adding to the problems concerning the permeability of the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border, this has profound implications for modern Afghan society. First, this
speaks to an ongoing breakdown of the rural and tribal systems. In a nation where over 80% of the
population lived in small rural villages, large numbers of people have abandoned this lifestyle to live
abroad, in refugee camps, or in urban centers. In any case, they have (to some degree) sacrificed their
local tribal identity. While many scholars note that this has created an ideal recruiting base for the
insurgency, it also creates a societal vacuum for modernizations such as education, industrialization,
and modern civil society – functions that would be well-fulfilled by an Afghan state.[56]
Despite such tumultuous circumstances, Afghans responded to the Soviet threat with a “strong sense of
national unity.”[57] This national unity was truly trans-ethnic and was realized only with the external
threat of the Soviet military. Ultimately, the Soviet-backed PDPA government failed. Halliday and Tanin
attribute the failure of the PDPA in large part to foreign powers. They write that the PDPA government
acted irresponsibly knowing that they enjoyed the military and financial support of the Soviet Union.
They also note that the commitment of the U.S., Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to the insurgency
guaranteed that no “meaningful political compromise” would be reached.[58] When the Soviets withdrew
in 1989 (and the US later abandoned their support), Afghanistan was forced to consolidate without any
external support. Sidky notes that the collapse of the state resulted in a shift toward “’identity politics’ in
which claims to power . . . are based upon exclusionary sectarian, ethnic, or linguistic identities
decoupled from nationalistic ideologies, the idea of the state, or national interests.”[59] It is impossible to
say what the subsequent Afghan Civil War would have looked like if the tribal structure had remained
intact or if the radicalization of Islam had been rejected. Nevertheless, it was precisely for these reasons
that the Taliban was able to rise to prominence in and around Kandahar and eventually make their way
into Kabul and the political culture.[60] Interestingly, the Taliban’s attempts at reform did not find much
more traction than those of the PDPA.[61] While the Taliban were effective at enforcing their particular
religious beliefs (even successfully preventing opium production in areas under their control between the
summer of 2000 and the harvest of 2001[62]), they were increasingly despised for imposing what were
seen as tribal norms as government policy. If the US had not ousted the Taliban government in late
2001, it is likely they would have faced a popular rebellion themselves.
Establishing and Undermining an Afghan Government: 2001-Present
Several months following the US retaliation against and ouster of the Taliban government, the United
Nations released the “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
establishment of Permanent Government Institutions.” This document set a roadmap for the
development of the new Afghan government and demanded that it fulfill  the highest requirements
regarding monopolization of the use of force, cooperation to eradicate “terrorism, drugs and organized
crime”, while preserving international humanitarian law.[63] In exchange, the United Nations and
international community pledged to “guarantee the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of
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Afghanistan as well as the non-interference by foreign countries in Afghanistan’s internal affairs” and “to
assist with the rehabilitation recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan.”[64] No doubt these latter
conditions were intended to create the space necessary for the consolidation of the new Afghan
government. Using the terms above from Michael Walzer, the Afghan Interim Administration sought to
create political freedom while relinquishing their self-determination to the international community.[65]
Afghan society has continued to change radically after the US invasion of 2001. Astri Suhrke writes that
since 2001 Afghanistan “contains the seeds of radical social change” which has partially modernized
Afghanistan while simultaneously introduced tensions between foreign intervention and Afghan
society.[66] Modernizing trends have certainly created modes of communication which can be seen to
encourage civil discourse. The proliferation of cell phones has provided an important method of
communication that breaks down many of the natural barriers that Afghanistan presents to effective
governance. Similarly, television in the cities and radio in the rural areas could provide an essential
impetus to the growth of an Afghan civil society. Improved transportation and the growth and
improvement of highways will be essential to facilitate the face-to-face contact which Afghans value so
highly. Unfortunately, the inability to eliminate insurgent checkpoints on major highways (and when able,
to merely replace them with military checkpoints) provides a major deterrent for travel. Recent problems
with petroleum deliveries from Iran have added to the isolation of the rural areas. In spite of these
modernizing advances, ISAF troops continue to isolate communities in order to prevent the spread of
the insurgency. Is it inconceivable that embracing these changes could encourage the growth of civil
society and thus pave the way for the development of an Afghan state?
Many of Afghanistan’s governments have failed because they attempted to institute modernizing reforms
from Kabul that were ultimately rejected by the rural population. Johnson writes that these failures
resulted from traditional Afghans conflating modernization with modernity.[67] In other words, they
believed that to enter the modern world they would have to forsake their traditional identity as Afghans
and Muslims. Developments in the last decade have in many ways brought Afghanistan into the modern
world. As long as these modernizing trends occur while foreign troops occupy their land and are seen to
prop up their national government, this confusion will continue. Only a true Afghan government, free from
foreign influence, will be able to address these issues within the framework of the Afghan worldview.
That Afghanistan has not had such a government since 1978 helps to explain the dissatisfaction with
national political institutions.
It is entirely possible that the international community underestimates these changes because the
Afghan elite (to whom the West has been listening) have a “flawed understanding of the considerable
changes experienced by Afghan society during the past three decades of war.”[68] Indeed, Western
attitudes toward Afghan politics seem fundamentally contradictory, both in theory and in practice. We
lament the political fragmentation caused by the numerous ethnic groups, while attempting to ensure
that the Afghan government represents all major ethnic groups.[69] This is exactly the tactic used by the
Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin to ensure that ethnic in-fighting would consume all political energies,
thus demanding ultimate reliance on external forces. Meanwhile, the international community has
removed any threat that would otherwise provide a basis for unification. Due to a tenuous US-Pakistan
relationship, the US has tied President Karzai’s hands with regard to addressing his concerns with
Pakistan. The current Afghan government does not have to fear border incursions from its neighbors
due to the international norm of juridical sovereignty and the presence of ISAF forces. The Afghan
National Army (ANA) has been given no responsibility for the protection of territory or citizens. And the
ANA, with the Afghan National Police (ANP), have nothing to hold them accountable for their readiness
except their ISAF trainers. The most significant unifying force in Afghanistan is widespread discontent
with the “direct political interference of the US-dominated international community” and “anger about the
behavior of foreign forces.”[70]
The sanctioned presence of armed militias outside of the government’s control significantly delegitimizes
the government. Only recently, President Karzai has called for the expulsion of private security groups –
and he was criticized in the Western press for seeking to monopolize the legitimate use of force in his
country. Instead, the US has begun to arm local militias again outside of any control of Kabul. Similarly,
President Karzai has recently called for the termination of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).
This was another extra-governmental organization that was dispensing aid and reconstruction directly to
the Afghan people, bypassing all government channels. U.S. policy-makers are asking the Afghan
population to accept Karzai’s regime as legitimate, while simultaneously recognizing that Karzai and his
administration cannot be trusted to disburse aid or effectively control the military.
The massive influx of foreign aid also undermines the Afghan government. From the US alone, which
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admittedly contributes the bulk of Afghan foreign aid, Afghanistan received over $15 billion last year. For
2011, that total is expected to exceed $17 billion.[71] Aid from the US alone equals more that the entire
nominal GDP for all of Afghanistan.[72] This has resulted in a government that has not developed the
capacity to effectively raise taxes, or conversely, to develop any public discussion for the allocation of
those taxes. Altogether, there has been no concerted effort to conduct a census or institute taxes that
would support a local or national government. As such, Afghanistan remains a rentier state, which
undoubtedly feeds the corruption that has become rampant among government officials.[73] Similarly,
no social or political contract has been established between the people and their rulers. Until  the
government is able to levy taxes and distribute services, the bond between government (at any level)
and population will be weak.
Conclusion and Implications
This article has suggested that foreign intervention in Afghanistan will necessarily fail to improve Afghan
governance. Both theory and practice suggest that foreign troops and financial aid undermines the
mechanics through which a state is formed. Underpinning the ISAF strategy of improving governance
are two competing ideologies: respect for the juridical sovereignty of Afghanistan, and a liberal anti-
pluralism that seeks to establish a democratic government that respects human rights. The nature of
these two ideologies suggests that they cannot co-exist, or that they at least contradict each other. As
discussed above, leaders within the international community have embraced a cosmopolitan liberal
theoretical framework in which political freedom (even democracy) and human rights have become the
primary goals of government. At the same time, this government is expected to exercise effective control
over its sovereign territory and population. The history of developed nations demonstrates that both are
not simultaneously possible at the outset. Yet, the violence and political turmoil which has resulted in the
creation of nearly every Western democracy is now thought to be unnecessary for the creation of
modern states. If this paper’s thesis is correct, it has important implications for the future of the Afghan
state.
Ultimately, the US and the international community are forced to choose between the establishment of a
self-determining Afghan state and a liberal Afghan colony. These are the only two possible logically
consistent conclusions. A self-determining state would be free from foreign influence and would be left
to fight for its own survival. It would face armed warlords from its own interior and a militant Pakistan
who would like to keep Afghanistan weak for its own strategic depth. It would have to form its army and
police for its own defense, and raise taxes for their sustainment. It would need to deal with radical
Islamists on its own terms, and would likely provide a training ground for terrorists for the foreseeable
future. It will depend heavily on the opium trade for revenue, and will likely face mounting international
pressure to harness its drug production. Afghan civilians would likely be targets of extreme violence and
women would face extreme prosecution. In short, it would probably closely resemble the Civil War years
of 1989-1996. In the end, there is a chance that after an untold number of years of violence, a
government might develop and begin to provide the stability we expect from a modern state. On the
other hand, a failure to consolidate could result in a Pakistani annexation, ultimately resulting in the de
facto demise of the country we now recognize as Afghanistan.[74]
If the international community chooses to establish an Afghan colony, the worst violence can be
avoided. Foreign forces can occupy the country and attempt to enforce human rights while giving the
illusion of democratic participation. United States troops will still fight insurgents much as they do today.
The Afghan government would be run effectively by US officials with competent Afghans incorporated
into the bureaucracy where needed. This would not be a puppet government; it would be an extension of
the US government. The situation would likely resemble the British colonization of India, though without
the lucrative financial benefits. And like India, there may come a time when Afghanistan is able to govern
itself and will seek to expel the foreign colonizers. This too will be a violent affair, and may even
approach the political turmoil suggested above.
Nevertheless, there has persisted a demand from the international community that we take the best from
both worlds. But the middle road is not much more appealing. As both of the coherent options are
distasteful, it seems that Afghanistan is doomed to be, at best, a weak state with marginal control over
its territory. Corruption will continue as long as foreign aid permits it to remain a rentier state and no
social contract is formed with Afghan tax-payers. Human rights violations will continue and Afghanistan
will face radical Islamists as it struggles to enter a modernity that remains conflated with western morals.
As stated at the beginning of this paper, there is an assumption that foreign aid can lead to the
consolidation of a liberal government. In theory, Walzer notes that this method necessarily fails. In
practice, this essay seeks to demonstrate that foreign aid undermines the mechanics that build effective
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state governments. There is a fundamental contradiction between the broadly accepted norms of
humanitarian intervention and sovereignty. As long as these competing notions generate broad appeal
among international leaders and the people who support them, effective state-building will continue to
be an important but impossible task. Interestingly, the participation of the international community in
support of these competing norms may also help to explain the mixed results of Charles Tilly’s war-
making, state-making theory in the contemporary third world.
This analysis is likely to be discomforting to both sides of the current debate regarding the future of
Afghanistan. Those who advocate a quick withdrawal may not be comfortable with the human rights
abuses which are certain to flare up inside Afghanistan. Those who favor a more lengthy commitment
certainly fear a long term nation-building mission with little hope of success. During his nearly year-long
review of the war in Afghanistan, President Obama advocated the challenging of US assumptions
concerning its commitment to Afghanistan. Clearly, these assumptions have not been challenged at all.
President Obama wanted to make clear his commitment was not to build an Afghan state, yet ISAF
remains committed to “improving Afghan governance.” This author fails to see a distinguishable
difference. ISAF’s new mission statement is the combination of two theoretical opposites. Before the
United States and its allies commit more troops and treasure to this conflict, there needs to be a solid
theoretical debate concerning the feasibility of the mission. This discussion will serve to educate the
public on the impossibility of having a legitimate, sovereign and liberal Afghan government immediately.
Thus, it will free U.S. policy-makers from the burden of having to form contradictory mission statements,
and the U.S. military from having to fight an unwinnable strategy.
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